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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ni. A. SHAW, FRANK ARM-
STRONG, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
S.A.LT LAKE COUNTY, a 
municipal corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE NO. 
7380 
Appellants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiffs in 'this action are all owners or resi-
dents of homes situate in a certain area of Salt Lake 
County which the plaintiffs designated the ''Cottonwood 
District." (Tr. 1.) The plaintiffs assigned certain arbi-
trary bounds to that district so referred to as follows: 
''From Holladay on the north to and includ-
ing the homes on the south side of 6200 South on 
the south, and from Wasatch Boulevard on the 
east, to and including the homes on the west side 
of Highland Drive on the west." (Tr. 1-2). 
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At the time of the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs 
obtained a temporary restraining order, restraining the 
defendants from operating a gravel ~it which was loca~ed 
within that described district. (Tr. 13-16). 
Salt Lake, County had theretofore entered into a cer-
tain agreement of lease with one Edwin B. Harper and 
his wife, whereby the County obtained a leasehold inter-
est in a tract of ground for the purpose of mining and 
processing gravel for the use of the County upon the 
public roads in Salt Lake County maintained by the 
County. (Tr. 1-2). Prior to the issuance of the tempor-
ary restraining order, Salt Lake County had placed 
machinery and equipment upon the premises and had 
. commenced operations for the extracting of gravel for 
public road purposes. (Tr. 2). The County had further 
planned to use a certain hot asphalt plant to further pre-
. pare road material for use upon the public roads a.nd had 
I 
purchased said plant. ( Tr. 241). 
The defendants filed a demurred to plaintiffs' com-
plaint, which, was both general and special in form, a.nd· 
noticed the said demurrer for hearing at the time defen-
dants were ordered to appear in connection with the tem-
porary restraining order. {Tr. 12). Upon the hearing 
of the order to show cause, the defendants duly moved 
the court for an order to vacate the temporary restrain-
ing order, which was theretofore issued ex parte. (Tr.12). 
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The court overruled the demurrer (rrr. 30) and denied 
the motion to vacate the temporary restraining order. 
(Tr. 24). The ra.use was thereupon duly tried and the 
rourt found that the proposed operations by the county 
'Yould constitute a nuisance (Tr. 46-49) and made perma-
nent its restraining order (Tr. 50-51). 
STATE1\1ENT OF FJRRORS 
1. That the court erred in overruling the defend-
ants' demurrer. 
2. That the court erred in denying defendants 
motion to vacate the temporary restraining order. 
3. That the court erred in finding that the operation 
of defendants' proposed plant would be a nuisance. 
4. That the court erred in permanently enjoining 
the defendants from the operations referred to. 
STATEJ\IENT OF J> ARTICULAR QUESTIONS 
INVOLVED FOR DErrERMINATION 
I. Whether an action of the kind brought by the 
plaintiffs in this case may be maintained against Salt 
Lake County or the named defendants as commissioners 
.of Salt Lake County for the creation or maintenance by 
the defendants of an alleged nuisance. Involved in this 
general question are three particular questions: 
a. vVhether Salt Lake County enjoys a SOV-
ereign immunity as a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah which precludes the maintenance 
against it of this kind of action. 
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b. Whether, assuming that such sovereign 
immunity exists, there is any provision in the sta~­
utes of the State of Utah which in any way modi-
fies or effects that sovereign immunity so as to 
authorize this kind of action to be maintained 
against the defendants. 
c. Whether, assuming that such sovereign 
immunity exists, it is in any way affected by the 
fact that the action is equitable in form and asks 
an injunction against an alleged nuisance. 
II. Whether, under the evidence before the court 
in thi,s action, a nuisance as an inevitable result is estab--
lished. 
III. Whether, even assuming such nuisance to be 
the result of the defendants' activities, all of such activ-
ities should be permanently enjoined under the facts and . 
circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Whether an action of the kind brought by the 
plaintiffs in this case may be maintained against Salt 
Lake County or the named defendants as commissioners 
of Salt Lake County for the creation or maintenance by 
the defendants of an alleged nuisance. 
(a) These questions were the basis of the defend-
ants' general demurrer, which demurrer "\\ras overruled 
by the trial court herein. Considering those questions 
in order, the first proposition is that the sovereign is 
immune again~t any suit that has. not been authorized 
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by that sovereign. We contend that that rule is too well 
settled to be seriously questioned. The issue is whether 
the county partakes of the sovereign immunity of the 
state, or whether the county is a separate entity which 
does ont enjoy that immunity. The constitution of th,t} 
State of Utah rec.ognizes the several counties as "legal 
subdivisions of this State," (Constitution of Utah, Arti-
cle II, Section 1). The nature of the county in Utah was 
further explained in the case of Emery County vs. Burre-
sen, 14 Utah 328 ... t\.t page 330 of the Utah Report, the 
court states : 
''A county is one of the political divisions of 
the state signifying the community clothed with 
such extensive authority and political power as 
may be deemed necessary by the superior control-
ling power of the state for the proper government 
of its people residing within its borders and for a 
proper administration of its local affairs.'' 
There a.re many other cases in surrounding jurisdic-
tions holding that the county is an arm or auxiliary of 
the state. In the ease of Roosevelt County vs. State 
Board of Equalization, a case decided by the Montana 
Supreme Court, and found reported in 162 Pacific 2nd, 
at page 887, the court says in part : 
''A county is but an agency or arm of the 
state government, created, organized and existing 
for civil and political purposes, particularly for 
the purpose of administering locally the general 
powers and policies of the state, and a.s a matter 
of public convenience in the administration of the 
government. It is generally a subordinate part of 
the sovereignty of the state itself, and is not an 
independent governmental entity.'' 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further cases in support of this proposition are: Com-
monwealth vs. Walker, 156 Atlantic 340, a Pennsylvania 
case;· tha City of Pendleton vs. Umatilla County, Oregon, 
241 Pacific 979; the City of Los Angeles vs. the County 
of ~os Angeles, 77 Pacific 2nd, 138; Gayer vs. Whelan 
District Attorney, 141 Pacific 2nd 514. In the last men-
tioned case which arose in the State of California, the 
' 
court says at page 516 of the Pacific report in part as 
follows, "the county enjoys the same immunity from suit 
and liabiilty as the state," citing the City of Los Angeles 
vs. Los Angeles County, 72 Pacific 2nd 138, 113 ALR 370, 
and Whittaker vs. the County of Tuolumne, 30 Pacific 
1016. Our Supreme Court has referred to the question 
of this immunity in the case of Lund vs. Salt Lake Coun-
ty, wherein it is said at page 515 of 200 Pacific, the 
following: 
''In support of the validity of plaintiffs alleged 
third cause of action, counsel do not contend that 
the county when acting in a governmental capac-
ity, would be liable for the negligence of its officers 
or agents for any injury occasioned by their negli-
gence ; hence it is not necessary to envoke the 
doctrine maintained with practical unanimity in 
nearly every jurisdiction of the country, to the 
effect that municipal corporations, especially 
county organizations, are not liable in such cases 
unless made so by express statute. Brief of respon-
dents counsel filed in the case upon this point is 
voluminous and conclusive.'' 
(b) The second question involved herein, is. 
whether authority has been given by any statute of the 
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State of Utah to maintain the action of the sort here 
before the court. Defendants contend that there is no 
statute here applicable. Subsection 1, of section 3, Chap-
ter 4, Title 19, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, defines gen-
erally the po,ver of a county to ''sue and be sued.'' It 
appears clear from the authorities that this statute 
simply constitutes the county as an entity to sue or be 
sued in those kind of actions in which the county is prop-
erly a plaintiff or defendant according to the other stat-
utes of the state. A case so construing a similar statute 
is Leanny Ys. Jefferson County, an Alabama case re-
ported in 32 So. 2nd at page 542. At page 543 of the So. 
Report, the court says in part as follows : 
''Notwithstanding the provisions of Title 12·, 
Section 3, Code, that a county is a body corporate 
with power to sue and be sued in any court of rec-
ord is nevertheless an arm of the state and is 
subject to immunity from suit which the state has, 
so long as it is engaged in governmental functions 
as to which no statute authorizes suit." 
Other Alabama cases to that affect are here cited. 
In accord is the New Hampshire case of 0 'Brien vs. 
Rockingham County reported in 120 Atlantic at page 
254. In that case the court said in part at page 255 of 
the Atlantic Report that a statute 
''declaring them to be corporate cannot confer 
upon them other powers or subject them to other 
duties than those which are conferred and im-
posed either by express provisions of some stat-
ute or are implied from the general character and 
design of such public corporations.'' (Citing 
cases.) 
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There is no other statute known to the defendants 
which is in force in this state and which expresly refers 
to the liability or non-liability of a county to suit. How-
ever, section 27, Chapter 3, Title 104, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, gives statutory consent to certain specially 
designated actions which might under certain conditions 
be brought against the State of Utah. This section does 
not of course, authorize an action of the type now before 
the court against the state or against the county. In the 
absence of some other provisions specifically referring 
to the county, defendants contend that this is the consent 
and the only consent which is given to bring action against 
the state itself, and the counties as subdivisions of the 
state. 
(c) Refering to the third question herein necessar-
ily involved, defendants propose to discuss the question 
of whether there is an exception to the sovereign immun-
ity of the state's political subdivision based upon the fact 
that a nuisance is claimed or that an injunction is the 
type of relief sought. There would appear. from the read-
ing of the text to be some conflict of authority on this 
question. That apparent conflict of authority is noted in 
20 CJS 1069, Section 216, as follows : 
''Nuisances. Whether a county may or may 
not be liable for the creation or maintenance of a 
nuisance has been decided in accordance with the 
rule prevailing in the particular jurisdiction as to 
the liab~lity of ~ounties for torts generally, as dis-
cussed In Section 216 Supra; other authorities 
~old that a county is immune from liability for 
Its torts does not extend to the creation or main-
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tenance of a. nuisance and have granted injunctive 
relief in favor of a private indiYidual as against 
a county for a threatened nuisance.'' 
rrhe principal cases cited in the footnote, in support 
of the proposition holding that it is immune from suit for 
a threatened nuisance are Leibman vs. Richmond, 284 
Pac. 731, 103 Cal. App. 354, and Jones vs. Jefferson 
County, 89 So. 17 J, 206 Ala. 13. In the analysis of this 
question defendants submit that it is perhaps important 
that the functions, scope and size of counties varies 
through the United States and that this court should 
take judicial notice of the fact that the counties in the 
western states differ in many particulars from counties 
in other parts of the country. (104-46-1 sub. 8, U.C.A. 
1943). The first mentioned case should be especially 
persuasive since the statutes in the State of California 
defining the county as a political subdivision are substan-
tially the same as in the State of Utah, and since the 
counties in the two. states are geographically and func-
tionally similar. The cases which are cited in the text 
at the page last mentioned in support of a contrary view, 
do not distinguish between a city and a county with 
regard to this liability. The earlier cases in the State 
of Tennessee have indicated that injunctive relief as 
against the county for a threatened nuisance, should be 
granted. But the later Tennessee case of Odil vs. Maury 
County, 136 So. West 2nd, page 500, seems to abandon 
this rule, at least in certain circumstances. At page 501 
of the report cited, the court refers to the general rule 
of non-liability on the part of the County, and states: 
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''this general rule applies to acts constituting nui-
sances," and cites in support of that statement many 
cases which are in accord. It is submitted that there is no 
valid reason for the distinction adhered to in some courts 
between tort liability generally and liability for nuisances 
alleged to be committed. The principal reasons for non-
liability on the part of the county generally are illus-
trated by the following quotations: 
'' This rule is the logical result of the 'vell 
settled doctrine that the state ma.y not be sued 
unless it consents thereto.'' - Larsen v. Yuma 
County ,225 P. 1115, 1116, 26 Ariz. 367, 15 OJ page 
569 note 63(a). 
And the other reason : 
"The absolution from liability of a county 
* * * rests upon the ground that the county * * * 
is simply a quasi corporation and not clothed with 
full corporate po,vers. '' - Shirkey v. Keokuk 
County, Iowa, 275 N.W. 706, 712, 225 Iowa 1159, 
withdrawn except as reaffirmed and modified 281 
N.W. 837, 225 Iowa 1159. 
It is submitted that upon logic and principle the fore-
going reasons apply with equal force whether the wrong 
complained of is an alleged negligent tort or an alleged 
nuisance. 
II. Whether, under the evidence before the court 
in this action, a nuisance as an inevitable result is estab-
lished. 
Referring· to the second question necessarily in-
volved, the attention of the court is invited to the general 
10 
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statements of the texts as to the restraining of threat-
ened or apprehended nuisances. 30 Am. Jur. at pages 
417-418 section 431 reads in part as follows: 
"But the general rule appears to be that an 
injunction ''"'ill be granted when, and not unless, 
the act or thing threatened or apprehended will 
be a nuisance per se, or a nuisance will inevitably 
or necessarily result from it. If the complainant's 
right is doubtful, or the thing which it is sought 
to restrain is not a nuisance per se and will not 
necessarily become a nuisance, but may or may 
not become such, depending on the use, manner of 
operation, or other circumstances, equity will not 
interfere.'' 
Numerous cases are cited in support of that general 
proposition.· The evidence in this case, appellants believe, 
establishes clearly that the question of whether the re-
straind operations would or \Vould not at any particular 
time becomes a nuisance as 'veil as the extent of such 
nuisanpe depends largely upon the force and direction of 
wind currents in relation to the plaintiffs' residences and 
the proposed site of operations. The evidence as to the 
probable direction and force of the winds was conflicting. 
The plaintiffs' evidence was non-expert and was based 
on o bserva tioils of the plaintiffs, all of whom were lay 
persons as far as physical sciences are concerned and 
some testimony by the witness Butler. Defendants evi-
dence was based on expert testimony and scientific facts 
insofar as those facts "rere available. It is submitted 
that the question of the effect of the wind is extremely 
questionable and that in that respect, if in no other, 
11 
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plaintiffs have failed to show that a nuisance would 
necessarily follow. The evidence of the plaintiffs with 
regard to the alleged effect on foliage was based upon 
certain tests made about December, 1927 in the eastern 
part of the country. It is submitted that these tests are 
too remote in time and distance to enable the court to 
deetrmine as a fact that a nuisance in this regard would 
necessarily follow from the conditions alleged to arise 
from defendants proposed operations. The extent to 
which the nuisances apprehended from proposed opera-
tions could be mini~ized or eliminated by the use of pro-
tective devices does not fully appear, but there is evi-
dence that some, at least, of the threatened damage could 
be eliminated or mini~zed through proper equipment 
to collect dust from the planned operations. The perma-
nent injunction issued by the trial court deprives the 
defendants of any opportunity to determine by experi-
ment what results will follow from the operations, and 
in effect the trial court is making a decision as to scien-
tific facts without, as appellants believe, any sufficient 
evidence or information upon which to determine that 
fact. 
III. Whether, even assuming such nuisance to be 
the result of the defendants' activities, all of such activ-
ities should be permanently enjoined under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
Another consideration is, of course, the public con-
venience and necessity resulting from the continuance of 
the defendants activities as opposed to the nuisance to 
12 
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the plaintiffs, assuming thnt that nuisance will result . 
.I\J 39 Am. J ur. page 471, section 195, appears the follo~1'­
ing general statement: 
''And \vhen the public welfare requires it a 
nuisance may, for special purposes, be permitted. 
Public. convenience or necessity may also be taken 
into consideration in some cases in determining 
\Yhether or not to grant equitable relief.'' 
It is submitted that Salt Lake County and all of the 
residents therein, and all persons traveling through Salt 
Lake County ha.Ye a direct and immediate interest in 
proper maintenance and construction of the county roads. 
It is further submitted that the taxpayers have a direct 
and immediate interest in the costs of such construction 
and maintenance and "\vill benefit from efficient prepara-
tion of road rna terials. The proper parties to determine 
the most efficient and economical manner with which to 
acquire road building materials are the duly elected c6m-
missioners of Salt Lake County. On the other hand, the 
damage, if any, to the majority of the plaintiffs is ex-
tremely remote and speculative. A few of the plaintiffs 
reside in the immediate vicinity of the proposed opera-
tion but the majority live a considerable distance away 
as will appear from the boundaries of the district in ques-
tion, as set up by the plaintiffs. Weighing the eonven-
ience and necessity of the public as a whole against the 
inconv~nience and possible damage to some of the plain-
tiffs, it would seem that equitable relief should have been 
withheld. 
13 
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It is respectfully submitted that the permanent 
injunction issuea by the trial court herein wa.s improperly 'J 
granted and that the same should be vacated and the 
action dismissed with costs to the appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDvV ARD M. MORRISSEY, 
County Attorney 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
Chief Deputy Cownty Attorney l 
WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON j 
Deputy County Attorney -1 .. ·.~, Attorneys for the Defendarnts 
and the Appellants 
RECEIVED two copies of the foregoing brief this ·~.'.1 
----------------------------day of September, 1949. 1 
CRITCHLOW, WATSON, and 
WARNOCK 
By-.----.------.. ------.-----------.----.-----... -------
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
14 
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